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Abstract—A core technique used by popular proxy-based
circumvention systems like Tor, Psiphon, and Lantern is to
secretly share the IP addresses of circumvention proxies with
the censored clients for them to be able to use such systems. For
instance, such secretly shared proxies are known as bridges in Tor.
However, a key challenge to this mechanism is the insider attack
problem: censoring agents can impersonate as benign censored
clients in order to obtain (and then block) such secretly shared
circumvention proxies.
In this paper, we perform a fundamental study on the problem
of insider attack on proxy-based circumvention systems. We
model the proxy distribution problem using game theory, based
on which we derive the optimal strategies of the parties involved,
i.e., the censors and circumvention system operators. That is, we
derive the optimal proxy distribution mechanism of a circumven-
tion system like Tor, against the censorship adversary who also
takes his optimal censorship strategies. This is unlike previous
works that design ad hoc mechanisms for proxy distribution,
against non-optimal censors.
We perform extensive simulations to evaluate our optimal
proxy assignment algorithm under various adversarial and net-
work settings. Comparing with the state-of-the-art prior work, we
show that our optimal proxy assignment algorithm has superior
performance, i.e., better resistance to censorship even against the
strongest censorship adversary who takes her optimal actions.
We conclude with lessons and recommendation for the design of
proxy-based circumvention systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet censorship is a global threat to the freedom of
speech, ideas, and information. An increasing number of re-
pressive regimes and totalitarian governments censor their cit-
izens’ access to the Internet [31], [17], [21], [6], [9], [4] using
techniques such as IP address filtering, DNS interference, and
deep-packet inspection [20], [34]. To help censored users get
around censorship a number of tools and techniques have being
designed and deployed by practitioners and academics, which
are broadly known as censorship circumvention tools [28], [8],
[11], [3], [19], [26], [27]. Such tools range from classic VPNs
and one-hop HTTP proxies to more advanced techniques such
as domain fronting [11], [14] and decoy routing [16], [38],
[18].
A core technique used by most of the widely-deployed
circumvention tools is to share some secret information with
the censored users for them to be able to use the circumvention
system. A censored client can only use the circumvention
system with knowledge of that secret information. That is, the
secret information is the censored users’ gateway to the free
Internet. For instance, in proxy-based circumvention systems
like Tor, Lantern, and Psiphon this shared information is the
IP address of some secret proxy server (e.g., a Tor bridge [7]
IP address), which enables a censored user to connect to the
circumvention system as long as the secret IP address of that
proxy is kept undisclosed to the censors (and therefore, non-
blocked).1 We refer to this problem as the proxy assignment
problem.
While some circumvention systems have started to partly
deploy domain fronting [11] to resist blocking of their cir-
cumvention proxies, domain fronting is —prohibitively ex-
pensive—to be deployed at large scale; therefore, the proxy
distribution problem as stated above remains a major challenge
to proxy-based circumvention systems.
Unfortunately, this widely-deployed approach (i.e., grant-
ing access based on secret information) is prone to a fun-
damental issue, which we call the insider attack. Major cir-
cumvention systems like Tor, Lantern, etc., are designed to
serve the masses, i.e., they are open to anyone who claims
to be censored. Therefore, censoring agents can impersonate
censored users and join the system in order to learn the secret
information (e.g., Tor bridge IP addresses), and consequently
block the circumvention system.
To limit the damage from the insider attack, a circum-
vention systems should limit the secret information disclosed
to the censoring agents (e.g., only disclose a small frac-
tion of Tor bridges to the censors). However, distinguishing
censoring agents from genuine censored users is extremely
challenging to circumvention system operators, as they will
connect from the same geographic regions, and are using the
same circumvention software. The main technique deployed
by circumvention systems to limit the damage by the insider
attack is constraining access to the secret information for each
requesting client. For instance, Tor restricts the number of
bridge IPs shared with each censored client to three at each
1Note that some of these circumvention systems have started to partly
deploy domain fronting [11] to resist blocking of their circumvention proxies,
however, domain fronting is —prohibitively expensive—to be deployed at
large scale; therefore, the proxy distribution problem as stated above remains
a major challenge to proxy-based circumvention systems.
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time. However, this mechanism is known to be ineffective.
For instance, Chinese censors were able to enumerate all Tor
bridges within a month [37]. Further, limiting the access to
such information (e.g., reducing the number of Tor bridges
shared with clients) is likely to impact the usability of the
circumvention system for genuine censored clients, e.g., a
genuine censored user may soon run out of working Tor bridge
IPs.
Our contributions. In this paper, we perform a fundamental
study on the problem of the insider attack on circumvention
systems. Without loss of generality and for simplicity, we
present our solution for the proxy assignment problem, how-
ever it can be trivially expanded to the generic problem of shar-
ing secret information in circumvention systems. Specifically,
we investigate the problem of circumvention proxy distribution
by finding the optimal strategies of the parties involved,
and deriving the Nash equilibrium. We do so by modeling
the proxy assignment problem with a game theoretic model.
Therefore, a significant contribution of our work is deriving the
optimal strategies of the censors and circumvention operators,
as opposed to designing ad hoc proxy assignment mechanisms.
Additionally, compared to prior studies [36], [23], [22] we con-
sider a more realistic threat model by incorporating practical
issues into our model, such as the geographic locations of the
clients and censors, the past actions of clients and proxies, etc.
We use game theory to find the optimal strategies of a
circumvention system operator in assigning proxies to the
clients in order to optimize the effectiveness of the circumven-
tion system (e.g., maximize the number of genuine censored
users who can obtain non-blocked Tor bridge IPs), while the
censors also take their best actions to maximize the censorship
damage. We model the proxy distribution problem using a
classic matching game called the college admissions game [12]
whose goal it is to admit students into colleges based on the
rankings provided by the students as well as colleges. We
build a proxy assignment game by making an analogy between
circumvention clients and students, as well as between proxies
and colleges. We define various metrics based on real-world
constraints of circumvention systems to enable the clients and
the proxies rank each other in the proxy assignment game.
Based on our game, we derive the optimal algorithm for proxy
distribution as well as the optimal censorship strategy.
We perform extensive simulations to evaluate our optimal
proxy assignment algorithm under various adversarial and
network settings. Comparing with the state-of-the-art prior
work, we show that our optimal proxy assignment algorithm
has superior performance, i.e., better resistance to censorship
even against the strongest censorship adversary who takes her
optimal actions. We conclude with the lessons learned for the
design of proxy assignment systems.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND THREAT MODEL
A. The Insider Attack Problem
Many circumvention systems work by sharing some secret
information with their clients, where the access to such secret
information is key in being able to use those circumvention
systems. For many systems, the shared information are the IP
addresses of the proxy servers used for circumvention, e.g., Tor
bridges [7]. While our analysis is generic to any circumvention
system relying to some degree on secret information, in the
rest of this paper we consider the shared secret information
to be the IP addresses of circumvention proxies for simplicity
purposes.
Figure 1 illustrates the main setting of proxy distribution in
a circumvention system. The problem consists of the following
entities:
• Distributor: A circumvention system entity which is in
charge of distributing the secret information about scarce
resources (e.g., proxy IP addresses) among clients. In the
case of Tor, this entity is Tor’s bridge distribution service.
• Censored Clients: The benign censored clients who are
genuinely interested in using a circumvention system to
sidestep censorship mechanisms. These users will ask the
distributor entity for proxy information.
• Censoring Agents: The rogue clients controlled by the
censorship authorities to impersonate real censored clients
and obtain the secret proxy information from the circum-
vention distributor entity.
• Censor: The central censorship authority who collects
and combines the information obtained by its censor-
ing agents. The collected information (e.g., Tor bridge
information) can be used by the censor to block the
circumvention system.
In this setting, the distributor entity has the objective to
disclose the lowest possible number of proxies to the censor. In
contrary, the censor entity aims at identifying as many proxies
as possible.
B. Bridge Distribution in Tor
The Tor project offers three mechanisms to the clients to
obtain Tor bridge IP addresses2: (1) a user’s Tor client software
(Vidalia) can directly obtain bridge IPs from Tor servers, (2)
a user can visit Tor’s bridge distribution webpage3 and obtain
bridge IPs after solving a CAPTCHA, and (3) a user can send
an email to bridges@bridges.torproject.org from
Gmail, Yahoo!, or Riseup! to receive bridge IPs via an email
response.
To protect bridge information from the censoring agents,
Tor limits the number of proxy IPs returned to a requesting
client to three. Tor identifies users based on their IP addresses
and email addresses depending on the mechanism used to
obtain bridges. However, such protection mechanisms are
ineffective against a resourceful censor who can create large
numbers of email accounts or connect from a diverse set of IP
addresses. In fact, the Chinese censors were able to enumerate
all Tor bridges over the course of a single month [37].
Note that as mentioned earlier, the proxy distribution prob-
lem is not only an issue for Tor, but for all major proxy-based
circumvention systems like Psiphon [28], Ultrasurf [35], and
Lantern [19]. While some circumvention systems have started
to partly deploy domain fronting [11] to resist blocking of
their circumvention proxies, domain fronting is —prohibitively
expensive—to be deployed at large scale; therefore, the proxy
distribution problem as stated above remains a major challenge
2https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges
3https://bridges.torproject.org/
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Fig. 1. Overview of proxy distribution in a circumvention system.
to proxy-based circumvention systems. For instance, due to
the high cost [25] of running Tor’s domain fronting bridges
(meek [24]), recent proposals suggest to use meek only for
bootstrapping, not for proxying circumvention traffic.
C. Threat Model
We assume that the clients have no way of obtaining the
proxy information other than contacting the distributor entity,
e.g., a censored client will not be able to obtain a proxy IP
by asking friends. Similarly, we assume that the censoring
agents can only obtain proxy information by requesting the
circumvention distributor. Therefore, we do not consider other
adversarial means of discovering proxies such as probing
suspicious IPs [37], zig-zag attacks [32], and other forms of
active attacks [15], [13] in this work. Needless to say, future
work can trivially include any of these techniques into our
generic game theoretic model (i.e., by modifying our utility
functions described in the following sections); we refrain from
doing so in this work in order to avoid over-complicating the
results.
Unlike the simplifying, unrealistic assumption made in
prior works [36], [23], [22], we assume that the censoring
agents are able to communicate among themselves and the cen-
tral censorship authority decides on blocking certain bridges
by aggregating information from all clients. Therefore, the
censor can strategically allow an identified bridge to remain
unblocked for a while, or block it instantly depending on the
importance of the discovered bridge as well as the reputation
of the censoring agent who discovered that bridge.
III. SKETCH OF OUR APPROACH
We start by summarizing previous attempts to study the
proxy distribution problem in circumvention systems. We will
then introduce the approach taken in this paper.
A. Prior Studies
A comparatively small number of research papers have
studied the problem of insider attacks in circumvention sys-
tems.
Client puzzles. As described earlier, one of the mechanisms
to obtain Tor bridges is to visit a Tor website and to solve a
CAPTCHA. However, CAPTCHAs are known to be trivially
defeatable by resourceful adversaries who can hire human
labor to solve them. Alternatively, several research papers [10],
[5] have investigated the use of cryptographic puzzles to defeat
enumeration by Sybil censors. Feamster et al. [10] provide
evidence that this approach has limited impact against powerful
censors.
Client Reputation. Some solutions like Proximax [23] lever-
age user relationships in online social networks like Facebook
to distribute proxy information. A more recent mechanism is
rBridge [36] that uses clients’ reputation to distribute bridge
information. In this approach, each user has an amount of
credits that changes over time based on the uptime of the
bridges she knows. To prevent the censors from enumerating
all bridges, rBridge users can only obtain new bridge IPs by
spending their (finite) credits. A user can also use her credits
to invite new users to rBridge. Unfortunately, these studies
make unrealistic assumptions to simplify their derivations. For
instance, they make no distinction between different proxies,
while in practice different proxies have different value to the
censors and clients (e.g., censors prefer to block proxies who
serve more clients). Also, they assume that the censoring
agents act independently in blocking proxies.
Theoretical bounds. To the best of our knowledge, Mah-
dian [22] is the only prior work to investigate the problem
of proxy distribution from a theoretical perspective. He finds
a lower bound on the number of required proxies using
techniques from information theory, however, also relies on
a number of unrealistic assumptions to simplify the analysis.
For instance, the author assumes that the number of censoring
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agents is known to the distributor, and the number of bridges
and users are constant.
B. Our Direction
We perform a fundamental study on the problem of proxy
distribution in circumvention systems. We use game theory to
find the optimal proxy distribution strategy of a circumvention
system (as opposed to ad hoc mechanisms) in the presence
of a censorship adversary who also uses her optimal strategy
in discovery and blocking the proxies (as opposed to ad
hoc censorship mechanisms). Our work takes a major step
forward in the study of proxy distribution systems by including
important real-world constraints in the model. We define utility
functions for each of the players involved in the insider attack
problem, including the censor, genuine censored clients, and
proxy distributor. In particular, we include constraints like the
location of clients, the clients’ patterns of using proxies, and
censors’ and clients’ preferences in obtaining new proxies. We
include reputation metrics for clients into their utility func-
tions, similar to previous work on reputation-based solutions.
Our model is generic, and future work can extend it from a
theoretical and practical perspective by considering additional
key features tailored to different circumvention systems like
the uptime of users, traffic volumes of users, or any other
real-world constraints of specific circumvention systems.
Paper’s Outline: The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. We first introduce the college admissions game in
Section IV, which is the theoretical approach we use to model
and evaluate the insider attack problem. We define the utility
functions of the entities involved in the proxy distribution
problem in Section V, and describe our proxy assignment
game in Section VI along with the optimal proxy distribution
and censorship strategies. We describe our simulation setup
in Section VII, and the simulation results are presented in
Section VIII. We discuss our results and offer concluding
remarks in Section IX.
IV. BACKGROUND: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS GAME
In this section, we provide an overview of the college
admissions game framework by Gale and Shapley [12], which
is the foundation for our game theoretic model. The college ad-
missions game is also referred to as deferred acceptance4 and
many-to-one matching game. First, we describe the assignment
criteria in the college admissions game. Second, we describe
the college admissions algorithm and its characteristics.
A. The Assignment Criteria
In the college admissions game, there are n students and
m colleges. Each college has a capacity of qi students that
can be admitted. Each student ranks the colleges based on
her preferences. Note that each student omits those schools
in her preference list that she would never choose under
any circumstances. On the other side, each college ranks
the students who have applied to that school based on the
college’s preferences. Similar to students, the college first
eliminates the students who will not be admitted under any
4We use deferred acceptance and college admission interchangeably
throughout the paper.
circumstances even if the college does not reach its capacity.
The college admissions algorithm then derives assignments
considering the preferences of both colleges and students;
subject to the capacity of colleges. Note that there may exist
different assignments of students to colleges. Here, we are
focusing on assignments which are stable. We define unstable
assignments in the following definition.
Definition 1. An assignment of students to colleges is called
unstable if there are two students 1 and 2 who are assigned
to colleges a and b, respectively, however, student 2 prefers
college a to b and college a prefers student 2 to 1 [12].
Note that it is possible that different stable assignments
exist. Then, the question is how to choose among different
stable assignments; ideally the optimal one. The following
gives the definition of an optimal assignment in the college
admissions game.
Definition 2. A stable assignment is optimal if every student
is just as well off under it as under any other stable assign-
ment [12].
It is worth mentioning that the optimal stable algorithm is
unique. In other words, there exists (if it exists at all) only one
assignment that is optimal and stable. Moreover, in the above
definition, the assignment is optimal from the students’ point
of view. In the following subsection, we provide an overview
of an algorithm that preserves these two features.
B. Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
In this subsection, we describe the deferred acceptance
algorithm. As mentioned in Section IV-A, there exist some
students that a college will not admit under any circumstances.
Here, in the deferred acceptance algorithm, the assumption
is made that these students are not allowed to apply for that
college. By considering this assumption, the algorithm is as
follows. First, all students apply to the college that is their
first choice. A college with capacity of q students places the
q students on the waiting list with the highest rank, or all the
students who have applied if there are less than q applicants.
The college rejects the remainder of the students. The rejected
students apply to their next choice. In a similar way, each
college selects the top q students from the students on its
waiting list from a previous round and the new students who
have applied to this college. The college chooses the top q
students and rejects the rest. This procedure terminates if each
student is on a waiting list of a college or has been rejected
by all colleges he had been permitted to apply. Finally, each
college admits the students on its waiting list.
The following two theorems describe the characteristics of
the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Theorem 1. There always exists a stable assignment in the
deferred acceptance algorithm [12].
Proof: Note that the deferred acceptance algorithm gives
an iterative procedure for assigning students to schools. Here,
we claim that the deferred acceptance is stable. In doing so,
let’s suppose that student a is not admitted by school b1, but
student a prefers school b1 to his admitted school b2. This
means that student a has applied to school b1 at some stage
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and student a has been rejected in favor of some students that
school b1 prefers more. Then, it is obvious that school b1 must
prefer its admitted students compared to student a. Therefore,
there is no instability in the deferred acceptance algorithm [12].
Theorem 2. Every student is at least as well off under the
assignment given by the deferred acceptance algorithm as he
would be under any other stable assignment [12].
Proof: We prove the optimality by induction. Let’s con-
sider student a1 and school b1 with q capacity. If student a1
is sent to a school under a stable assignment, we call that
school a possible one for student a1. Let’s assume that at
a stage in the deferred acceptance algorithm, no student has
been rejected from a school which is possible for him. Let
us assume that school b1 has received q applications from q
students, i.e., a2,..., aq+1, who are more qualified compared
to a1. As a result, school b1 rejects student a1. We need to
show that school b1 is impossible for student a1. Note that
each student ai, where i ∈ {2, ..., q + 1}, prefers school b1
to all of the other schools except those schools that they have
previously applied to and have been rejected. In a hypothetical
assignment, let us assume that student a1 is sent to school b1
and all other students are sent to schools that are possible for
them.
Note that there exists at least one student ai where i ∈
{2, ..., q+1} who has to go to a school which is a less desirable
school compared to b1. It is straightforward to see that this is an
unstable assignment due to the fact that both the school and the
student are dissatisfied about this assignment. This hypothetical
assignment is unstable and school b1 is impossible for student
a1. We can conclude that the deferred acceptance algorithm
only rejects students who cannot be admitted in any stable
assignment. Hence, the resulting assignment is optimal [12].
Why we use this game in our model. We use the college
admissions game to establish an optimal mechanism to assign
proxies to clients; we call our mechanism the proxy assignment
game. On a conceptual level, we model the proxy assignment
problem by using the college admission game as a foundation
as follows: the clients (including the censoring agents) act as
the students who are interested in learning the addresses of the
proxies, and the proxies act as colleges as each of them has a
finite (known) capacity for serving clients. Solving this game
results in the assignment of proxies to clients.
It is important to note that the theory and concept of
the college admissions game and the deferred acceptance
algorithm is successfully applied in practice, and has stood
the test of time [29]. Even predating the publication of the
seminal paper by Gale and Shapley is the National Resident
Matching Program used to place United States medical school
students into residency training programs. Nowadays, over
40,000 applicants and 30,000 positions are part of the program
on an annual basis. At the same time, over 60 matching
programs for medical subspecialties follow similar processes
[29]. More recently, the matching approach has also been used
in the scenario of school choice in the New York and Boston
public school systems [1]. Further, key insights of the general
concept are used in diverse scenarios such as kidney exchanges
[30]. Finally, the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences was awarded to Roth and Shapley “for the theory of
stable allocations and the practice of market design;” thereby
validating the profound practical and theoretical impact of the
work.
V. DEFINING UTILITY FUNCTIONS
A. Main Model
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model for
the proxy assignment problem. Towards this, we leverage
the analogy between the college admissions game introduced
above and our proxy assignment problem. Specifically, we
formulate the proxy assignment problem as a college admis-
sions game in which colleges, i.e., proxies, and students, i.e.,
users, rank each other based on their utilities (preferences).
In doing so, we define utility functions for users and proxies
as described in the following. We will then use the deferred
acceptance (DA) algorithm, introduced in Section IV, to find
the stable associations between users and proxies, i.e., the Nash
equilibrium.
Similar to the college admissions game, we need to define
metrics for both users and proxies to rank each other. In
doing so, we define utility functions for these entities in our
framework.
In our model, there are n users in need of proxies to
circumvent censorship who are represented by a set A =
{a1, a2, ..., an}. This set contains the IDs of all users in our
system. Among these n users, m of them are censoring agents,
denoted by J = {j1, j2, ..., jm}. All of these censoring agents
are controlled by the censor. There are also l proxies in the
system denoted by a set I = {i1, i2, ..., il}. Each user is
provided k proxies by the distributor at any request. We divide
the time dimension into intervals called stages denoted by t
(the game starts at t = 0). All the actions by the players, such
as asking for new proxies, blocking proxies, providing proxies,
etc., are performed at the end of the stages, not during a stage.
In the following, we use the subscript a to refer to a client,
and the subscript i to refer to a proxy. t represents the time
stage. Table I lists all the notations that we use throughout the
paper.
Possible Actions of Players: In each stage of our game, a
censored client can take one or both of the following actions:
(1) use a proxy she already knows for browsing (for censoring
agents to look like benign clients), and/or (2) issue a request
for new proxies. This is shown in Algorithm 1. In addition to
the above actions, a censoring agent also shares her obtained
proxy addresses with the central censor entity, who will decide
whether to block that proxy at that given stage. The strategy
taken by a censoring agents is complex, which is discussed in
Section VI-A. At each stage, each proxy decides if he wants
to accept a requesting client or not. Note that the distributor
entity plays the game on behalf of all of the proxies and tries
to identify the optimal assignment between the proxies and
the requesting clients (we assume that proxies trust the central
distributor entity.)
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TABLE I. NOTATIONS
Variable Definition
t stage of the game
A (I) Set of all users (proxies)
J(m) Set (Number) of censoring agents
n (l) Number of users (proxies)
Ci Capacity of proxy i
cti Number of connected users to proxy i up to stage t
Bti (Bti) Number of users who have the address of proxy i
bi Number of corrupt users having the address of proxy i
γta,i indicator of user a use of blocked proxy i up to stage
t
T ta,i Time user a uses proxy i up to stage t
Rta user a’s number of requests up to stage t
δta Number of blocked proxies that user a has up to stage
t
τti Total time of using a proxy i up to stage i
da,i Distance of user a from proxy i
uti(a)(u
t
a(i)) Proxy (client) utility
φ(a) Utility of each censoring agent
Φt Utility of the central censor
µb, µs Rate of new clients in birth interval (stable interval)
λb, λs Rate of new proxies in birth interval (stable interval)
(α1, α2, α3, α4, α5) Weighting factors in (4)
(β1, β2, β3) Weighting factors in (3)
(ω1, ω2) Weighting factors in (9)
η Acceptance utility threshold for new proxy request
ν Cost of losing a censoring agent
ρ Ratio of the censoring agents to the total number of
clients
pi1(i) Number of censoring users connected to proxy (i)
pi2(i) Number of censoring users connected to proxy (i)
with enough utility to request new one
pi3(i) Number of censoring users assigned to proxy (i)
pi4(i) Number of censoring users with utilities lower than
acceptance threshold
p Probability of blocking a proxy for a conservative
censor
T Maximum time a user can use proxy for utility im-
provement
Algorithm 1 A benign censored client’s strategy
1: if Can connect to previous proxy then
2: return
3: else
4: Request for new proxy
5: Remove proxy from your pool
6: while Know any proxy do
7: if Can connect then
8: return
9: end if
10: Remove proxy from your pool
11: end while
12: end if
B. Metrics to Distinguish Censors from Clients
We use the following metrics to distinguish censoring
agents from genuine censored clients:
Blocked proxy usage (γta,i): While each client may know
multiple proxy IP addresses, she will likely use only one of
them at any point in time. Therefore, if one of her unused
(idle) proxies is blocked by the censor, a benign client may
not immediately request new proxies, while a censoring agent
may continuously ask for new proxies. We define the metric
γta,i to indicate if a user a who has been using the proxy i up
to time t will request a new proxy:
γta,i =

1 if user a has used proxy i
up to stage t and request a new proxy,
0 Otherwise.
(1)
Proxy utilization (Ta,i′): Typically, a censoring agent will
not use a proxy, which she has obtained from the distribution,
while a genuine censored client will likely utilize her obtained
proxies to circumvent censorship. Therefore, the utilization of
the obtained proxies can be taken into consideration as a factor
to distinguish genuine clients and censoring agents. Of course,
a censoring agent can also use the obtained proxies in order
to look like genuine clients. This, however, will be costly to
the censors. (Real-world censors are not known to be doing
so.) We use the metric T ta,i to represent the duration of time a
user a has used the proxy i during the total time interval of t.
Number of requests for new proxy addresses (Rta): We use
the metric Rta to represent the number of requests that user a
has made up to stage t for new proxies. A benign client will
typically ask for new proxies only once all of her proxies are
blocked, whereas a censoring agent is likely to request new
proxies more frequently to expedite its proxy discovery.
Number of blocked proxies that a user knows (δta): We
use the metric δta to represent the number of blocked proxies
that user a has known up to stage t. The metric is expected to
be larger for censoring agents than genuine clients.
Client locations (da,i): We use da,i to indicate the distance
of user a from proxy i (in practice, this distance is estimated
based on IP addresses). We normalize da,i to the range [0, 1].
As discussed later, we use this distance metric to optimize
performance and censorship resistance in our utility functions.
C. Metrics to Rank Proxies
We also define the following metrics to compare the im-
portance of various proxies. Censors are interested in learning
(and blocking) the more important proxies, so the distributor
should be more protective of the more valuable proxies.
Number of users who know a proxy (Bti ): The number of
users having the address of proxy i at stage t is denoted by
Bti .
Number of users connected to a proxy (cti): This is the
number of users connected to a proxy i at stage t.
Total time utilization of a proxy (τ ti ): Another metric to
quantify the importance of a proxy is the sum of time intervals
it has been used by different users. We use the following
metric:
τ ti =
∑
a∈Bti
T ta,i, (2)
where Bti is the set of user IDs that have the address of proxy
i up to stage t. A higher value of τ ti means the proxy is more
important for circumvention.
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D. Utility Functions
In this section, we derive the utility functions of the users
and proxies in the proxy assignment problem based on the
metrics introduced above. Suppose that a client a ∈ A has
requested proxy i ∈ I at stage t.
Client’s utility. We define a client’s utility as:
uta(i) =
(
β1B
t
i + β2c
t
i + β3τ
t
i
)( 1
da,i
)
. (3)
in which, the user’s utility is weighted with the proxy im-
portance factors introduced in Section V-C, i.e., Bti , c
t
i, and
τ ti . That is, the user’s utility will be higher if he chooses
(and is assigned) the more important proxies (since they are
more reliable). In the above utility function, β1, β2, and β3 are
the scaling factors indicating the relative importance of each
of the proxy metrics. We also use the (normalized) distance
metric, da,i ∈ [0, 1], in the exponent of our utility function
for two reasons. First, the distance metric helps clients to
be assigned to proxies that are closer to them, therefore,
improving the quality of connection (that is, clients prefer
proxies with better performance). Second, the distance metric
increases the chances of assigning the same proxies to the
clients in the same neighborhood. Therefore, this improves
resilience against censors who are running censoring agents
within the same subnet. Note that putting the distance metric in
the exponent, the assignment algorithm prioritizes the location
of clients before considering the other metrics.
Proxy’s utility. The proxy distributor has three objectives:
(1) assigning as many censoring agents as possible to the
same set of proxies, (2) assigning censored users to reliable
(non-blocked) proxies, and (3) keeping the proxies alive as
long as possible. To achieve these three objectives, we use our
defined parameters in the previous subsection to define a utility
function for each proxy. The utility of proxy i ∈ I at stage t
for user a ∈ A is as follow:
uti(a) =
(
α1 min(
∑
i′∈I
Ta,i′ , T )− α2Rta
−α3
∑
i′∈I
(1− γta,i′)− α4δta + α5
)( 1da,i )
.
(4)
As can be seen, the defined utility function uses the client’s
metrics defined in Section V-B to rank clients based on their
chances of being censoring agents versus benign censored
clients (α1, α2, α3, α4) are the scaling factors weighing the
significance of different metrics whose choices will be dis-
cussed in Section VII-A6). We also use the distance metric in
the exponent as discussed above for client’s utility function. In
our formula, we use the minimum for uptime metric to prevent
a censoring agent from cheating by making a large utility value
through using a single proxy for a long time.
We assume that a benign client will not ask for new proxies
before using his previosuly-obtained proxies. Therefore, we
use a very large value for α3 compared to the other scaling
factors. α5 is the initial utility for new users. We will later
discuss the values of the scaling factors (α) in more details.
VI. PLAYING THE PROXY ASSIGNMENT GAME
In this section, we show how users and proxies rank each
other based on our defined utility functions in Section V. We
then derive the optimal attacker model in the proxy assignment
game, and present our optimal proxy assignment algorithm.
Note that the proxy assignment game is virtual, meaning
that the central distributor plays on behalf of all of the proxies
and clients. In particular, a client does not issue a request
for specific proxy addresses, since that user does not know
the identities of the proxies. Instead, a user only requests
some new proxy addresses and the distributor who knows
all of the proxies gives that user one or more new proxy
address(es). Thus, the proxy admissions game takes place
when a distributor receives a certain number of proxy requests
at stage t. The distributor then plays the game on behalf of
both users and proxies by calculating the utility of all proxies
and all users requesting new proxies according to the utility
functions of (4) and (3). As a final step, the distributor assigns
proxies to the clients requesting new proxy addresses based
on the deferred acceptance algorithm.
A preference relation i for a proxy (client) is defined
over the set of all clients (proxies). This relation is a binary
relation which is complete, reflexive, and transitive [12]. By
using these preference relations, proxies and users can rank
each other. A proxy i ∈ I will rank all users making requests
at stage t. In doing so, for any two users a, a′ ∈ A and a 6= a′,
we define the following preferences for a proxy i ∈ I:
a i a′ ⇒ uti(a) ≥ uti(a′), (5)
where uti(.) is given by (4). The user with the highest utility
according to (4) is the most preferred user for proxy i.
Similarly, each user a ∈ A uses the following preference
relation a to rank proxies i, i′ ∈ I (i 6= i′):
i a i′ ⇒ uta(i) ≥ uta(i′), (6)
where uta(i) is given by (3).
Note that in a college admissions game, it is desirable
to have strict preferences (denoted by ). Here, we assume
that when a player is indifferent between two choices, that
player ranks these two choices randomly, e.g., by tossing a
coin. Furthermore, in a college admissions game, each college
can have a threshold for accepting new students. Here, we set a
global threshold for all proxies. The utility of each user should
be at least more than η to be able to request a new proxy. That
is, the distributor computes (4) without taking into account the
distance metric da,i and compares it to the threshold η. If it is
more than η, the distributor accepts the request and uses (4)
to compute the stable assignment.
We use the deferred acceptance algorithm for proxy assign-
ment for censorship circumvention since it provides a stable
assignment. Based on Theorem 1, the deferred acceptance
algorithm guarantees that in the resulting assignment at the
end of each stage, there is no user, regardless of his type, who
prefers another proxy where that proxy also prefers that user.
Further, according to Theorem 1, the resulting assignment is
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optimal from the user’s perspective. In other words, if there
are some users that share their proxies with each other, they do
not have any incentive to change their proxies with other. For
censoring agents considering the fact they are controlled by
the censor. They share their proxy addresses with each other,
but none of them have incentive to use other censoring agents.
Considering all users are rational, none of them have incentives
to use the proxies that other users have. Therefore, there is no
need for each proxy to save the identity of users to examine
whether they use other users’ proxies.
A. Optimal Censorship Strategy
In this section, we derive the optimal attack strategy for
the censor. Unlike previous work that assumes each of the
censoring agents to act independently, we consider a more
realistic, stronger threat model in which the central censorship
authority decides the actions to be taken for all of the censoring
agents in order to maximize the censorship damage. Note that
unlike the distributor entity, the censor entity does not know
the list of all proxies in the system. Consider P to be the
set of proxies (out of all existing proxies) that are known
to the censor (i.e., obtained by its censoring agents). The
censor entity uses utility functions similar to those used by
the distributor (which we will describe below) in order to
decide its optimal strategy, i.e., one that maximizes the utility
functions of its censoring agents. Particularly, the censor uses
the following utility function to rank the proxies he knows (P):
ut(a) =
(
α1 min(
∑
i′∈I
Ta,i′ , T )− α2Rta
−α3
∑
i′∈I
(1− γta,i′)− α4δta + α5
) (7)
This is similar to the utility function used by the distributor
in (3). It excludes the distance metric da,i as the censor does
not care about the distance of the proxies to be blocked.
Note that losing a censoring agent is costly to the censor
(we quantify it with ν), so he tries to minimize such losses.
The censor loses an agent if the agent’s utility goes below
the acceptance threshold (η). We, therefore, extend the utility
equation as follow:
φ(a) =
{
ut(a) ut(a) ≥ η
−ν o.w (8)
The optimal attacker can likely infer the coefficients in
the equations from the behavior of the distributor over time.
Therefore, in our simulations we used the same values for the
attacker and the distributor.
An optimal attacker aims at maximizing his total utility
as well as block as many benign users as possible. In other
words, in each stage of the assignment, the attacker wants to
maximize the following metric:
Φt = ω1
∑
a∈J
φt+1(a)− ω2
∑
i∈I
ct+1i (9)
Note that on the right hand side of this equation, the stage
is equal to t+1 rather than t. Here, the optimal attacker wants
to increase the total of his utility in the next stage in order to
receive a better ranking from the distributor’s point of view.
Further, the optimal attacker aims to decrease the number of
connected users to all proxies in the next step. Therefore, we
see this factor with a negative sign in the above formula.
Note that ω1 and ω2 are constants representing the relative
importance of these two factors. One can tune the values of
the scaling factors in (9) to match it to different kinds of real-
world censors, i.e., to make the censor more or less aggressive.
Finally, the optimal attacker selects a set of proxies to block
in such a way as to maximize (9). This is known to be a
NP problem, however, since each user is connected to only
one proxy at a time, the attacker can use the independence of
proxies to break down the equation for each proxy. Therefore,
we have ∆Φt = Φt − Φt−1 = ∑i∈P ∆Φt(i), where
∆Φt(i) = ω2c
t
i − ω1 ((α1 + α2)pi1(i)
−α1pi2(i) + α4pi3(i) + νpi4(i)) . (10)
pi1 indicates the number of the censoring agents connected
to proxy i who have enough utility to request new proxies
and increase their utilities. pi2 shows the number of censoring
agents who were connected to proxy i and have enough utility
to request a new one, but cannot earn utility from that proxy
(i.e., they get the maximum utility from that proxy). pi3 is the
number of censoring agents who have been assigned to proxy
i, and pi4 is the number of agents whose utilities are below
the acceptance threshold. As said before, a rational distributor
will set α3 to a very high value and as a result, the censoring
agents never request new proxies. Therefore, the attacker only
considers requesting proxies to replace proxies that his agents
have been connected to. This is the reason why we do not have
α3 in this equation. In (10), the attacker can compute pi1, pi2, pi3
by considering i to be a blocked proxy. By computing ∆Φt(i)
for each proxy, the censor will determine the proxies to get
blocked. If ∆Φt(i) is positive, the attacker blocks the ith proxy,
otherwise he will leave it unblocked.
As each censoring agent likely knows multiple proxies,
the censor also needs to decide for each censoring agent to
which of these known proxies the agent should connect to.
It is reasonable for the censor to maximize the number of
unique proxies his agents are connected to in order to block a
higher number of benign clients. To determine which proxies
the censoring agents should be connected to, we model the
problem as a matching problem [2]. Each censoring agent has
a set of proxies and we want to assign each agent to one
proxy in order to maximize the number of unique proxies.
In particular, we model this using the maximum cardinality
matching on a bipartite graph [2]. To solve this problem, the
attacker can use the Hopcroft Karp algorithm [2]. If an agent
has no unique proxy to connect to, that agent chooses one of
its available proxies at random.
B. Optimal Proxy Distribution Strategy
Algorithm 2 summarizes the optimal proxy assignment
mechanism used by the distributor to assign proxies to the
requesting clients. Recall that the distributor plays the assign-
ment game on behalf of all users. Benign censored clients
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will only petition the distributor for new proxies once all of
the proxies they know are blocked. At the end of each stage of
the game, the distributor will collect all of the proxy requests
and run the assignment game, described above, to map proxies
to requesting clients.
Algorithm 2 Optimal proxy assignment.
1: The new users are initially assigned to new k proxies
2: Users request new proxies
3: For each user, the distributor builds a preference list based
on (5)
4: For each proxy, the distributor builds a preference list
based on (6) (each proxy rejects the users whose utilities
are less than the threshold)
5: The distributor runs the deferred acceptance algorithm [12]
to get the stable assignment
6: The distributor assigns new proxies to the users
VII. SIMULATIONS SETUP
To evaluate our proxy assignment algorithm, we imple-
mented a proxy system simulator in Python. Apart from the
censor and the distributor algorithms, it is essential to derive
the various parameters of our model, including the number
of users, the ratio of censoring agents to censored users, the
number of proxies, as well as various scaling factors in the
utility functions.
A. Simulation Parameters
We use Tor, presumably the most popular proxy-based
circumvention system, as an example of a proxy-based circum-
vention system in order to derive some of the parameters. Tor is
primarily an anonymization system, but it has been extended
to be used as a circumvention system by introducing Tor’s
non-public relays called bridges. Therefore, we only consider
Tor’s bridges (but not its public relays) as the “proxies” in our
proxy assignment game. Needless to say, the parameters can
be adjusted to other systems and threat models.
1) System’s lifespan: Figure 2 presents the number of
active Tor bridges per month over time (error bars show
standard deviation during each month). The figure shows a
monotonic increase in the number of bridges during the first
few years of their inception, which has changed in recent years
due to various social and political events like the post-Snowden
effect. Suggested by this figure, we divide the lifespan of a
circumvention system into two phases. The birth interval is
the initial phase of the circumvention system’s operation, i.e.,
until it reaches a stable rate of growth. The second phase is
the stable interval, which starts right after the birth interval.
In our simulator, we define each time unit as one day in real
world. We set the birth interval to 365, therefore, representing
1 year in real world.
2) Ecosystem: Figure 3 shows the number of Tor bridge
users per month over time, showing different rates of increase
in different intervals. Inspired by this, we define the following
parameters to model Tor’s ecosystem:
• µ: The rate of new clients per time unit. µb is the rate
during the birth interval, and µs is the rate after the birth
interval.
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Fig. 3. Number of Tor bridge users per month [33]
• λ: The rate of new proxies per time unit. Similarly, λb is
the rate during the birth interval, and λs is the rate after
that.
We also define the parameter ρ to denote the ratio of the
censoring agents to the total number of clients. When adding
a new user to the system, she will be a censoring agent with
the probability ρ, otherwise a benign client.
To consider different settings, we define various ecosys-
tems each with different values of the mentioned parameters.
Table II lists the ecosystems used in our simulations.
3) The distribution of censoring agents: We consider two
different types of censors. An omnipresent censor is a re-
sourceful censor who is able to run censoring agents at various
geographic locations (which therefore appear more like normal
clients). On the other hand, a circumscribed censor is one who
is running its censoring agents within a limited region, i.e.,
inside a single subnet.
4) Users’ locations: In our simulations, we model the
world as a X × X rectangular map with coordinates from
(−X2 ,−X2 ) to (X2 , X2 ). The censorship region covers a rectan-
gular region from (−y,−y) to (y, y). Genuine censored users
are uniformly distributed within the censored region, and the
proxies are uniformly distributed outside of the censorship
region. For the omnipresent censor, the censoring agents are
distributed similar to benign users (i.e., uniformly). For the
circumscribed censor, the censoring agents are distributed
uniformly in a rectangular from (−y1,−y1) to (y1, y1), where
y1 < y. In our experiments, we set X = 20000, y = 1000,
and y1 = 100.
We use the Euclidean distance to determine the distance
between the users and proxies. We normalize the distance
metrics to the range [0, 1].
5) Proxy parameters: Similar to Tor, the distributor returns
3 proxies to each new client. For existing clients, the distributor
uses the game as discussed above to assign bridges. Also,
without loss of generality, we set the capacity of each proxy
to be 40 clients.
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TABLE II. DIFFERENT CENSORSHIP ECOSYSTEMS
World Name µb λb µs λs
Static 25 5 0.1 0
Slow 25 5 5 0.2
Alive 25 5 10 0.5–7.5
Popular 25 5 20 0.5–10
TABLE III. VALUES FOR CONSTANTS
Constants Relative Values
(α1, α2, α3, α4) (Small, Very Small, Very Large, Large)
(β1, β2, β3, η) (Small, Large, Large)
(η, α5) (Small, Large)
(ω1, ω2, ν) (Small, Large, Very Large)
6) Scaling factors: Table III shows the relative values of
the scaling parameters of our utility functions ((3) and (4)), as
used in our experiments. In (4), we use a small value for α1
to let benign users increase their utility by using their proxies
over long time periods. The small value of α1 also prevents
the censoring agents from increasing their utility of (4) by
excessively using their proxies. We set α2 to a very small value
as it is common for censored clients to request new proxies. We
set α3 to a very large value since asking for a new proxy while
having an unused proxy will be suspicious to the distributor.
Finally, we set α4 to a large value to punish users who have
many of their assigned proxies blocked. In our experiments,
we use (α1, α2, α3, α4) = (1, 1, 100, 5.0). We also set T to
100 (T denotes the maximum value).
In (3), we set β1 to be smaller than β2 since a proxy is
more valuable if it has a large number of clients who are using
it. Similarly, we set β3 to be large to give more preference to
the uptime of proxies. This also encourages the distributor to
assign older proxies with higher priority. In our experiments,
the values for these constants are (1, 5, 5).
η is the acceptance threshold of requests by proxies, and
α5 is the initial utility of a client. Obviously, the acceptance
threshold should be less than the initial utility; we use 0 and
10, respectively.
Finally, in (9), on the one side we have the sum of the
utility points that a censoring agent loses by blocking proxy
i, and on the other side the utility benefit a censor gets by
blocking that proxy. We assume that blocking users is more
important to the censors than keeping the censoring agents
alive, therefore we set ω2 to be larger than ω1. We also use
a large value for the cost of losing agents, ν. We use 1, 100,
and 500, respectively.
B. Evaluation metrics
In our experiments, we use the following four metrics to
evaluate the performance of proxy assignment in each setting.
• Number of connected censored users: This is the num-
ber of censored clients who know an unblocked proxy,
and that proxy has unused capacity to serve the client.
• Ratio of connected censored users to total number
of censored users: This shows the fraction of censored
clients who know unblocked proxies and can connect to
them.
• Total capacity of the proxies: This shows the total (used
and unused) capacity of all unblocked proxies.
• Wait time: This metric shows how many rounds a
censored client should wait to receive unblocked proxies.
C. Censorship Strategies Evaluated
In addition to the optimal censorship strategy designed
in the previous section, we evaluate two other censorship
strategies in our evaluations that represent the mechanisms of
previous studies. Therefore, we use the following censorship
strategies in our evaluations:
• Aggressive censor: In this model, each censoring agent
will immediately block a new proxy that she has learned.
• Conservative censor: In this model, each censoring agent
keeps the proxies she has learned alive for a certain
amount of time in order to increase her utility of the
system. We use the same utility function used in our
game (equation (7)) to model the utility of independent
censoring agents. A censoring agent will block proxies
after this time interval with probability p. If the censoring
agents cannot increase their utility of (7) by waiting
longer, she will simply block the proxies with probability
1.
• Optimal censor: This is the optimal game-theoretic cen-
sorship strategy derived in Section VI-A.
Recall that in previous bridge distribution mechanisms,
particularly the state-of-the-art in rBridge [36], the censoring
agents act independently in obtaining and blocking proxies,
i.e., they do not communicate among themselves. Therefore,
we use the aggressive and conservative censorship strategies
to model the censors of prior work, and compare them to
the optimal game-theoretic strategy derived in this paper. One
can simply define other types of adversaries for independent
censoring agents.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate our proxy assignment game based on the
setup described in Section VII. We use the metrics defined in
Section VII-B to evaluate the performance of our assignment.
We evaluate our game for the different censorship ecosystems
(Table II), against different blocking strategies (Section VII-C),
and for different distributions of censoring agents (omnipresent
vs. circumscribed).
A. Static World
As shown in Table II, the “static world” is the censorship
ecosystem in which no new proxies are added to the system
over time. As intuitively expected, our experiments show that
the circumvention system is inefficient as the censors can
eventually discover a large fraction of the proxies. Figure 4
shows the performance metrics (Section VII-B) of our proxy
assignment mechanism in the static world ecosystem for an
aggressive censor (for different fractions of censoring clients,
ρ). As can be seen, even for the non-optimal aggressive censor
(which is the least strategic censor), the circumvention system
is not able to keep up, and (even the weakest) censor is
able to block a large fraction of the proxies, therefore, the
connected ratio metric does not increase over time with new
clients joining the system (e.g., for ρ = 0.1). We conclude
that independent of the censorship strategy, a circumvention
system needs to add new proxies over time to be able to keep
up with the censors.
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Fig. 4. Aggressive censor in a static world ecosystem.
• Lesson One: Independent of the censorship strategy, a
circumvention system needs to add new proxies over time to
be able to keep up with the censors.
B. Different Distributions of Censoring Agents
As mentioned earlier, we have two types of censoring agent
distributions: omnipresent and circumscribed. Figures 5 and 6
compare the performance for these two distributions. As can
be seen, the omnipresent type of censoring agents are more
impactful since they can obtain a larger number of proxies due
to their location diversity (which confirms (4)). However, note
that it is costlier for the censors to distribute their censoring
agents, therefore, the omnipresent censor represents a more
resourceful censorship authority. In the following experiments,
we will mainly use the omnipresent distribution as it represents
a stronger censorship adversary.
• Lesson Two: Resourceful censors can increase their
success by geographically distributing their censoring agents.
C. Comparing Censorship Strategies
In Section VII-C, we introduced three strategies for the
censors: optimal, which is the game-theoretic strategy derived
in this work, and the two strategies of aggressive and conserva-
tive, which represent the mechanisms proposed by prior work.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 compare the performance for aggressive,
conservative, and optimal strategies, respectively. We observe
that unlike previous works, our proxy assignment algorithm
works better against a censor with a conservative blocking
strategy than an aggressive one. This is because based on
our utility functions, the conservative censoring agents do
not gain any significant rewards due to longer wait times
before blocking. Further, our utility functions give preference
to older proxies by including a proxy’s reliability (duration of
operation) to rank proxies. Therefore, conservative censoring
agents will likely get similar proxies that other censoring
agents have obtained previously.
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Fig. 5. Circumscribed censor with Aggressive blocking in Slow world
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Fig. 6. Omnipresent censor with Aggressive blocking in Slow world
Also, comparing our optimal strategy to conservative and
aggressive strategies, we find it to be significantly stronger,
i.e., it blocks proxies more successfully than the ad hoc
mechanisms of aggressive and conservative. We will use the
optimal strategy in our following simulations as it is the
strongest censorship strategy.
• Lesson Three: The censors can intensify their damage
by applying strategic censorship mechanisms, as opposed to
ad hoc ones.
D. Different Ecosystems
We also compare the different ecosystems defined in Ta-
ble II, each using different rates for adding new users and
proxies.
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Fig. 7. Omnipresent censor with conservative blocking in Slow world
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Fig. 8. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in Slow world
As we can see in Figures 9 and 11, the rate of new proxies,
λs, is a critical factor in our system. By comparing different
λs values, we observe that each setting (different µs) has an
equilibrium point. If λs is less than that point, the system
will degrade over time and the censor will be able to defeat
the system eventually, and the speed of degrading is directly
related to that rate. On the other hand, if the rate is higher than
that equilibrium threshold, the system will be underutilized,
and therefore cost-ineffective. Based on these Figures, for high
λs, all of the experiments get similar results in the number of
connected users, but when λs is higher than the equilibrium
point (e.g., λs = 10) we see a significant unused capacity.
Further, in Figures 9 and 11, we show that as we reduce the
rate of adding new proxies, the rate of losing proxies increases
exponentially.
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Fig. 9. Omnipresent censor location with optimal blocking in Alive world
and ρ = 0.05
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Fig. 10. Omnipresent censor location with optimal blocking in Alive world
and ρ = 0.1
• Lesson Four: The rate of adding new proxies to a
circumvention system is crucial for its effectiveness. The rate
should be derived based on the capabilities of the censor.
Also, by comparing the Alive (Figures 9 and 10) and
Popular (Figures 11 and 12) ecosystems, we see that the birth
interval of these systems can have an impact on the long-term
operation of the system. If the censoring agents can get into the
system at very high rates during the birth interval, the system
will not be able to recover, regardless of the rate of adding new
proxies during the stable interval. Based on Figures 10 and 12,
for a very high rate of new proxies, there is available capacity
in the proxies. But the system cannot trust the large number
of censored clients who lost many of their proxies during the
birth interval. For instance, let us compare the rate λs = 10 to
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Fig. 11. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in Popular world and
ρ = 0.05
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Fig. 12. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in Popular world and
ρ = 0.1
λs = 7.5 in Figure 12. In this figure, the total proxy capacity
metric is much higher for λs = 10 than λs = 7.5, however,
the number of connected users are the same.
• Lesson Five: A proxy distribution system should boot-
strap with trusted clients. Bootstrapping with a large fraction
of malicious (censoring) clients can make the system unrecov-
erable.
Finally, Figures 13 and 14 compare the Alive and Popular
worlds for a high censoring agent rate of ρ = 0.2. We
see that even for such a high rate of censoring agents, the
circumvention system can survive by using a proper rate of
adding new proxies to the system.
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Fig. 13. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in Alive world and ρ =
0.2
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Fig. 14. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in Popular world and
ρ = 0.2
E. Comparison to rBridge
In Figure 15, we compare our proposed proxy assignment
algorithm with rBridge [36], the state of the art prior work.
We use an aggressive censor for both of the systems for a
fair comparison (rBridge does not have an optimal censor).
We choose the parameters similar to values in [36], and we
use ρ = 0.05, µs = 5, λs = 0.5. As can be seen, our
proxy distribution mechanism is significantly more resistant
to censorship than rBridge (against the same censor attacker).
That is, our mechanism can keep a larger number of censored
clients unblocked.
• Lesson Six: Our game-theoretic proxy distribution mech-
anism outperforms previous state-of-the-art mechanisms, as
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Fig. 15. Comparison with rBridge [36] using the same settings.
they are based on ad hoc approaches.
IX. DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS
One of the main goals of this paper is to analyze the
existing proxy distribution mechanisms for censorship circum-
vention in order to provide insights for designing stronger
proxy assignment mechanisms. We have seen in practice that
censoring countries are capable of blocking most Tor bridges
in their purview [37]. Moreover, the number of Tor bridges
has not seen proper increases in recent years (see Figure 2).
According to our experiments and analysis, no distribution
algorithm can protect the proxies from censoring agents as long
as there is no influx of new proxies. Applied to Tor, this means
that all bridges can/will eventually be blocked if the rate of new
bridges continues to remain low. The reason for the lack of new
bridges in the Tor ecosystem can be likely attributed to the fact
that adding new bridges to the ecosystem is expensive (for both
volunteers and Tor operators). In order to manage this situation
and reduce the cost, Tor could change the IP address of bridges,
or use expensive technologies like domain fronting [24], [11],
[25]. But, nonetheless, Tor as a censorship circumvention tool
requires a better policy for bridge distributions. The results of
our paper show the importance of central management to play
the role of a single distributor in each jurisdiction. Further,
our experiments and analysis corroborate the usefulness of
our proposed proxy assignment game as a policy for this
distributor. Another important factor which is derived from
our experiments and can be used in Tor ecosystem is that the
rate of new bridges in Tor should be proportional to the ratio
of the censoring agents (which is valid for any proxy system).
The other observation from our experiments is the im-
portance of the birth interval. If the censor can corrupt a
system during the birth interval, it is very hard for a distributor
to recover the system according to our experiments. One
of our main suggestions for a proxying system is to use a
very restricted invitation system, such as [23], for the birth
interval. After a while, i.e., during the stable interval, the
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Fig. 16. Omnipresent censor with optimal blocking in alive world. We have
ρ = 0.02 during the birth interval that can be construed as restricted invitation
system. In the stable interval, we have ρ = 0.1, i.e., open world.
system can transit to an open system, without a restricted
invitation system. One of the main drawbacks of using an
invitation system is that it cannot scale well to a large number
of users. But, here, we merely propose using an invitation
system in order to control the ecosystem in the birth interval
which mitigates the invasion of the censoring agents. Also,
most of the invitation systems are capable of handling a fair
amount of users in the birth interval. To evaluate our proposal,
we designed an additional experiment where the ratios of the
censoring agents are different in the birth interval and the
stable interval. In the birth interval, we have ρ = 0.02. After
the birth interval, i.e., stable interval, this ratio increases to
ρ = 0.1 (for example, by changing to an open registration
system). Figure 16 shows the outcome of our experiment. By
comparing Figure 16 to Figure 10, we can observe an obvious
difference. In other words, the system is able to defend itself
during the birth interval, which also means that it is able to
maintain its performance afterwards.
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